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Words Felt ‘Round the World:
Searching for a Balance between Free Speech and Genocide Prevention
Karl Reifsteck, Author
Raymond W. Schowers Prize Winner

As human capacity for information sharing increases in rapidity and breadth of
the target audience, we are confronted with increasingly complex problems from around
the world. One of these problems is incitement to violence, and particularly incitement to
genocide. Because of our communication abilities the effects of words uttered or written
in one corner of the world urging others to violence can, and are, felt throughout nations
and around the globe.
Genocide is not a new concept (and certainly history bears evidence to many
gruesome events throughout time), but humanity’s awareness of its horrors are greater
than ever before. Our increased awareness has lead humankind to seek to punish the
perpetrators of genocide, as well as take steps to prevent genocide before it begins. To
this last end, governments have greater ability to intervene before an individual acts and
speech escalates into larger conflict. The idea of government censorship of action and
speech necessitates that free societies strike a balance between freedom of expression and
freedom from repression.
This article will review the approach taken by the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”) in the trial of three defendants, each accused of
inciting genocide. In evaluating the ICTR’s opinion I will examine some of the more
significant precedents the Tribunal relied upon in its decision. I will also analyze U.S.
jurisprudence on preventing incitement to violence, and briefly compare the international
and U.S. approaches to punishing incitement. My analysis of U.S. jurisprudence will
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focus mainly on the U.S. Supreme Court case of Virgina v. Black 1 , as well as a few
earlier cases dealing with government prohibitions on hate speech.
I have chosen to examine American jurisprudence on prohibiting hate speech for
two reasons: First, because the ICTR’s opinion draws many analogies and principles
from international cases proscribing hate speech, and thus, a limited examination of U.S.
jurisprudence on this subject is a proper comparison. Secondly, the ICTR specifically
cited to Black in its opinion as an example of how the Tribunal’s approach was in accord
with U.S. free speech protections 2 . The Tribunal’s conclusion is not far off the mark,
though there is a key difference in the American approach.
After a short introduction to international genocide prevention law (Part I), I will
briefly examine the history of ethnic tension in Rwanda in Part II. Part III(A) of this
article will review the international legal standards upon which the ICTR drew
throughout its opinion. Part III(B) will then examine the application of these international
sources to each of the three defendants. Next, in Part IV, I will briefly resume the current
status of U.S. incitement jurisprudence. Part V is a comparison of the two approaches,
and is followed by my conclusion in Part VI.

I. Introduction
After the end of the Second World War, one of the challenges facing the new
United Nations was how to address the atrocities the world witnessed in the Holocaust.
On December 9th, 1948, one day before the adoption of the International Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations General Assembly acted. It adopted Resolution 260
1

538 U.S. 343 (2001).
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T ¶ 1010 (2003) (available online at:
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf).
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(III) A, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
Convention defined Genocide as:

[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 3
The Convention further outlined five criminal acts; genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide,
and complicity in genocide. 4 The Convention did not provide any further guidance on the
definition of these crimes.
The United States signed the Convention on December 11th, 1948, the first day
the Convention was available for signing. 5 The U.S. Senate, however, did not ratify the
Convention until November 25th, 1988, forty years later.6 While the Senate did provide
several “Reservations and Understandings,” these shed no light on the definition of
“direct and public incitement to genocide.” The only related reservation stated: “nothing
in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United
States.” 7
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 2. Concluded at New York,
Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951. 78 U.N.T.S. 277. (available online at:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm).
4
Id, Art. 3.
5
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Ratifications and Reservations,
(available online at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/1.htm, last updated July 18, 2007).
6
Id.
7
Id.
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Rwanda acceded to the Convention on April 16, 1975, entering an exception only
to the provision reserving interpretation of the terms of the Convention to the
International Court of Justice. 8 In August 1993, a UN Special Rapporteur investigating
ethnic killings in Rwanda, noted in his report that the Convention was binding on
Rwanda. 9
The most recent episode of genocide in Rwanda occurred in 1994. The killings
lasted for 100 days. The UN Security Council acted quickly, and in November of 1994,
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try suspected perpetrators
of “genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” 10
The ICTR has extensively applied the Genocide Convention during its trials. It
has convicted several defendants for the charge of direct and public incitement to
genocide. This paper will focus on three defendants in particular: Hassan Ngeze, JeanBosco Barayagwiza, and Ferdinand Nahimana. The joint trial of these three defendants
became known as “the Media Cases.” 11
I have chosen these defendants not only because this was one of the most
publicized trials of the ICTR, but also because these three men were convicted of direct
and public incitement to genocide for activities connected with print media, broadcast
media, and a political party. Two of these areas (print media and political parties) are
traditionally given great First Amendment protection in the United States, while
broadcast media has been subjected to larger amounts of government regulation. Also, in
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Ndiaya, B.W., Question on the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…, Report on his
Visit to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 (available online at:
http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/ndiaye1993.htm).
10
United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of Nov. 8, 1994, S/Res/955, §1 (1994).
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Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-T (2003).
9

5

the Media Cases, all three defendants engaged in political speech, perhaps the most
sacred region of protected speech. The defendants were convicted, at least in part, for that
same speech.
II. A Brief History of Ethnic Tension in Rwanda
Rwanda has been a turbulent land for many centuries. Indeed, even its history is
hotly disputed. Rwandans and scholars differ greatly on the origins of the three groups of
people that inhabit the land. The first and numerically largest of these groups is the Hutu,
who, in the 1930s, accounted for around 85 percent of the population. 12 The second
largest, the Tutsi, accounted for about fourteen percent. 13 The smallest of the groups is
the Twa, which constituted only about one percent of the populace. 14
Two main stories of the origins of Rwanda have emerged through the years. In
one telling, all three groups have always lived in and around the area of present-day
Rwanda. 15 In this account, the groups established a feudal-style society which eventually
evolved into a kingdom. In the second version, the Tutsis came to “the land of one
thousand hills,” as Rwanda is known, from the North (possibly in the Horn of Africa) and
migrated into a region controlled by the Hutu tribe. The Tutsis eventually conquered the
Hutu and established a kingdom. 16
In either case, for many centuries sources agree that both Hutu and Tutsi shared
the same language (called Kinyarwanda), practiced the same traditional religions, were
loyal to the same king, lived side-by-side on the same lands, and even belonged to the

12

Lyons and Straus, Intimate Enemy, at 26, Zone Books (2006).
Id.
14
Id.
15
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 31, Human Rights Watch (1999) (Allison Des Forges also
served as a witness during the Media Cases to explain the cultural backdrop and history of Rwanda).
16
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, rev. ed. at 4, Verso (2004).
13
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same clans. 17 Some recent research also suggests that during the monarchy the terms
Tutsi and Hutu were used to denote social status rather than ethnicity. 18 The Tutsi were
the cattle-raising rulers, while the Hutu were the common farmers. 19 The Twa were
originally a forest-dwelling people who eventually became poor artisans and servants to
the rest of Rwandan society. 20 Recent studies suggest that it was possible to change from
Hutu to Tutsi through monetary and political success, or even marriage. 21 However,
intermarriage with the Twa was very frowned upon by Hutu and Tutsi alike. 22 The term
Tutsi originally meant “one rich in cattle” in Kinyarwanda, while Hutu denoted a
subordinate or follower of a more powerful person. 23 Additionally, the terms Tutsi and
Hutu were not important distinctions in areas on the fringes of the king’s control, taking a
back seat to clan and other group identifiers. 24
A final, important distinction among the peoples of Rwanda is geographical. Until
the mid to late Nineteenth Century the northwestern region of present-day Rwanda was
ruled by a few small Hutu-dominated kingdoms. 25 Among these kingdoms lived a small
Tutsi minority, which exercised little or no political power. 26 This area remained Hutu
dominated, and the power relationship figures prominently in later Rwandan politics.
At the end of the Nineteenth Century, what some label the “fourth group” or
Bazungu arrived. Today this term is used to refer generally to whites, but at its origins it

17

Lyons and Straus, Intimate Enemy, at 26.
Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, at 14-15, Kumarian Press (1998).
19
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 33.
20
Id, at 33-34.
21
Lyons and Straus, Intimate Enemy, at 26, and Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 33, 37.
22
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 34.
23
Id, at 32.
24
Lyons and Straus, Intimate Enemy, at 26.
25
Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, at 15.
26
Id.
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referred to people who live a particularly luxurious and exclusive lifestyle. 27 The
Bazungu influence manifested itself first as German and then, in 1917, Belgian control.
In the early 1930’s the Belgians introduced identity cards, stating the name and ethnicity
of each Rwandan. 28 The taller, lighter-skinned Rwandans were defined as Tutsi, the
shorter darker-skinned Rwandans were Hutu. 29
The Europeans had a definite sense of ethnic hierarchy: Bazungu to Tutsi to Hutu
to Twa. 30 Consequently, the Tutsi enjoyed special social, economic, and political rights,
while the Hutu did not. 31 The Belgians introduced European-style bureaucracy to the
already complex Rwandan royal administration. 32 This bureaucracy also included
installing Tutsi administrators in the more independent and heavily Hutu Northwest. 33
Tensions rose between Hutu and Tutsi as international pressure grew for European
countries to give up their colonial holdings. 34 Many Hutus wanted to install majority-rule
before the Belgians departed, while the Tutsi wanted to preserve the current Tutsidominated state. 35 The Belgians eventually installed more Hutu in the government and
allowed them to run in local elections, and Hutus started to gain equal civil status. 36 The
Belgian view was to retain power, grooming the people for eventual independence.
As the country moved toward independence the political parties were organized
along ethnic lines. The Parmehutu (Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu),
27

Id, at 16.
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 37.
29
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T ¶¶ 105-109 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-I, ¶¶
80-111).
30
Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, at 17.
31
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 37, and Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise
in Rwanda, at 16.
32
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 34-35.
33
Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, at 15-16, and Des Forges, Leave None
to Tell the Story, at 39.
34
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 38.
35
Id.
36
Id.
28
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fought for majority Hutu rule, while UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise) fought to
retain the Tutsi-lead monarchy. 37 In November of 1959 a few Tutsi attacked a local Hutu
leader. 38 News of this attack quickly spread, and many Tutsi were slain in reprisal before
Belgian forces re-established order. 39 Later UN estimates projected the number of Tutsi
dead at 2,000. 40 In response to the violence Belgian authorities ousted many Tutsi from
local government posts and replaced them with Hutus. 41 These new bureaucrats helped
the Parmehutu party win the first elections, and in January 1961, the Hutu-controlled
government declared independence from Belgium. This call for independence was later
ratified by a plebiscite, and Rwanda gained full independence on July 1, 1962, with the
Parmehutu in power. 42
Over 250,000 Tutsi fled the country in anticipation of government reprisals during
this time. 43 These refugees settled in neighboring Burundi and Uganda. 44 By 1963 many
of these refugees had organized themselves into paramilitary groups. These groups
launched a small-scale invasion of 1500 men into Rwanda to oust the new Hutu
president, Gregoire Kayibanda. 45 The invasion was easily repelled by the Parmehutu
forces. However, in response Kayibanda instigated widespread killing of Tutsi remaining
in Rwanda. Among the first victims of this genocide were the Tutsi political opposition
leaders. The violence, however, soon spread throughout the country. President Kayibanda
appointed a minister in each of the prefectures (the largest administrative region in
37

Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 38.
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 6.
39
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 39.
40
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 7.
41
Id.
42
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 39, and Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T ¶¶
105-109 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-I, ¶¶ 80-111).
43
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 8.
44
Id, at 7.
45
Id, at 8.
38

9

Rwanda) to supervise the elimination of Tutsi. 46 Roving death squads accompanied by
government propagandists carried out the attacks. These groups established road-blocks
to prevent Tutsi from escaping into the countryside. Most of the killing was done by hand
with Hutu commonly using farm implements, including the panga, a machete used for
cutting wild grasses. 47 In the end, it is estimated that 10,000-14,000 Tutsi were killed
during this time. 48 By the end of the 1960’s over 20,000 Tutsi died in ethnic violence
and over seventy percent of the original Tutsi population had fled to neighboring
countries. 49 By 1991, Tutsis constituted only about 8.4 percent of all Rwandans. 50
In 1972 a second genocide occurred in the region, this time in Burundi. Here, the
Tutsi had managed to retain power after independence. After a group of Hutu tried to
seize power in a coup, reprisals against Hutus were swift and terrible. The systematic
slaughter claimed the lives of over 200,000 Hutu in Burundi. 51
President Kayibanda used these killings as an excuse to “purify” Rwanda of Tutsi,
and more killing ensued. In July of 1973, however, Kayibanda was ousted from power by
another Hutu, Juvenal Habyarimana. 52 Kayibanda was from the South, and as such
favored southern Hutu. Resent of this arrangement grew in the North, as northern Hutu
felt excluded from the benefits of power. The Habyarimana government reversed the
situation, with the new president favoring his native north, while southern Hutu were
relegated to the fringes of governmental power. 53

46

Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 9.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, at 20.
50
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 40.
51
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 9-10.
52
Id, at 10.
53
Id, at 12-13.
47
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Habyarimana also instituted a one-party state, with the MRND (Mouvement
Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Devéloppement) in sole control of political power.
Soon there was no difference between the state and party, with Habyarimana head of
both. 54
Habyarimana’s favoritism for his inner circle in his spoils system, as well as
increased evidence of rampant governmental corruption, eventually led to much dissent
throughout the country. 55 By 1990, with the economy in sharp decline Habyarimana was
forced to end his single-party state. 56 However, he made one last bid to retain absolute
control.
In the early 1990s, as ill-sentiment between the two groups continued to build, a
Tutsi militia was founded in neighboring Uganda. It called itself the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), and on October 1, 1990 attacked Rwanda. Habyarimana now saw his chance
to end political dissent. With RPF forces still days away from reaching the capital, the
residents of Kigali endured a night of explosions and gunfire. The next day government
officials announced that the “attack” was the result of RPF infiltrators, and their Hutu
accomplices. Using this staged attack as a pretext, Habyarimana’s supporters imprisoned
thousands of Tutsi and Hutu dissenters. 57
The government also used this staged event and further real RPF attacks to justify
forming local Hutu militias. Originally formed as the military wing of the MRND, these
militias were called Interhamwe, meaning “those who work closely together and who are

54

Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 40.
Id, at 47.
56
Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 24.
57
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 49-50.
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united.” 58 Violence escalated as RPF, Interhamwe forces, and regular Rwandan Army
troops increasingly clashed in the countryside. The international community intervened,
however, and the two sides hammered out several peace agreements, each of which was
in turn broken. One report estimated that 2,000 Tutsi were killed from 1990 to early
1993. 59
Finally, some amount of stability was attained under the Arusha Accords, signed
in 1993. The Accords were a series of agreements between the Habyarimana-lead
Rwandese government and the RPF ending the war of the past three years. These
agreements were signed in Arusha, Tanzania on August 4, 1993. 60 Under the agreements,
more Tutsis were appointed to government posts. To protect these new bureaucrats the
RPF was allowed to station 600 troops in the capital, Kigali. The presence of RPF troops
in the capital did little to allay fears on either side. 61
Even with the staged attack and imprisonment, torture, and killing of 13,000
dissenters three opposition parties formed in August, 1991. 62 Among these was the Parti
Libéral (PL), which stated that one of its goals was to bridge the divide between Hutu and
Tutsi. 63 In sharp contrast a bitterly anti-Tutsi party was formed, the Coalition pour la
Défence de la Républic (CDR). The CDR’s goal was to represent the interests “of the
majority.” While it openly criticized Habyrimana and the MRND, the CRD also
cooperated frequently with the MRND. This collaboration lead many observers to
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Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: the Rwandan Genocide, at 26.
Id, at 341.
60
United Nations Security Council Resolution 872, S/RES/872 (1993) (“Welcoming” the signing of the
Arusha Accords).
61
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T ¶¶ 105-109 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-I, ¶¶
80-111).
62
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 49.
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conclude that the CRD was simply the mouthpiece for the more radical views which were
too politically sensitive for the MRND or the president to express directly. 64
On April 6th, 1994 an airplane carrying President Habyarimana crashed near
Kigali airport. Immediately, Hutu extremists blamed Tutsi rebels for the loss of the
president. 65 This allegation later proved unfounded, but that was of little consequence at
the time. The reports of RPF responsibility set off a firestorm of speculation that RPF was
going to invade to take over the government. These rumors provoked mass killings of
Tutsis and moderate Hutus throughout the country. The violence finally ended when the
RPF actually did invade the country, and seized the capital. 66
Analysis after the violence ended suggests that ten percent of the population was
killed in one hundred days of slaughter. This amounts to approximately one million dead.
Roughly 250,000 Tutsi lived in the city of Kibuye before the genocide. Afterward,
authorities could locate only 8,000. 67
In November of 1994, the U.N. Security Council established the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try the alleged leaders of the genocide. 68 Since its
inception the ICTR has completed thirty-five trials, with twenty-seven more in progress,
and seven defendants still awaiting their day in court. 69 All of these trials involved
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the Media Cases are one of
only a handful of trials where the crime of incitement figured prominently.
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Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, at 52-53.
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66
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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ICTR website, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (accessed, Feb. 26, 2008)
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III. International Law of Incitement: The Media Case
A. International Framework for Analyzing the Crime of Incitement
During the drafting of the Convention on Genocide one delegate remarked, “It [is]
impossible that hundreds of thousands of people should commit so many crimes unless
they had been incited to do so….how in these circumstances, the inciters and organizers
of the crime should be allowed to escape punishment, when they were the ones really
responsible for the atrocities committed.” 70 It is this sentiment that drove the Prosecutor
throughout “the Media Cases.” The three defendants were; Hassan Ngeze, a newspaper
editor; Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a political party leader; and Ferdinand Nahimana, a
radio executive. Each of them was tried for direct and public incitement to genocide, in
addition to genocide, other inchoate genocide charges, and various crimes against
humanity.
One difficulty facing the Tribunal in these cases was defining “direct and public
incitement to genocide.” Genocide, of course has a statutory definition (found in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide, and cited
above in footnote 3 and related text), the application of which the world has become
familiar since its drafting in 1948. It is the particularized crime of “direct and public
incitement” that has eluded development, despite its inclusion in the original text of the
Convention. The ICTR statute adopted the Convention’s elemental definition of
“genocide,” as well as its blanket language referencing “direct and public incitement to
genocide” verbatim. 71 There was little alternative, however, as no other international
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Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. ICTR-99-52-T ¶¶ 978, (citing Akayesu (TC), ¶ 551).
Statute of the ICTR, Art. 2, (available online at: http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2004.pdf)
(the Statute also does not set out the elements of individual Crimes Against Humanity in Article 3, among
which are murder, rape, deportation, and torture.)
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document sets out the elements of “direct and public incitement.” Neither the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
have genocide as one of the crimes enumerated within their jurisdiction. The
International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to hear genocide cases, but its statute leaves
out the incitement offence. 72
In determining the judicial standards applicable in the Media Cases the Tribunal
turned to past decisions of other international courts as well as international treaties.
From these decisions and conventions the Tribunal extrapolated several points of law.
First, the Tribunal identified the tension between preventing speech which incites
violence, and preserving individual freedom of expression. Secondly, it recognized three
factors by which to evaluate the intent of alleged incitement speech: the content, the
context, including the medium chosen; and the causal link between the speech and
ensuing violence, if any.

i. The tension between preventing incitement and individual rights
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, “All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination…and against any incitement to
such discrimination.” 73 Article 19 declares, “Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression.” 74 Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) echoes this latter sentiment, while Article 19(3) of the ICCPR
qualifies this. It states that the right to freedom of expression, “carries with it special
72

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, Art. 6 (2002) (available online at:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf).
73
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 7, Adopted by the UN General Assembly, Dec. 10, 1948,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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Id, Art. 19.
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duties and responsibilities.” 75 Article 20(2) goes on to outlaw “advocacy of national,
racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or
violence.” 76 Article 4(a) of the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) has similar provisions banning speech which is based
upon racial hatred or inciting listeners to violence against a racial or ethnic group. 77
CERD Article 4(b) prohibits all organizations and propaganda activities which “promote
and incite racial discrimination.” 78
These treaty provisions demonstrate an international willingness to limit speech in
favor of protecting other rights. One particular case before the UN Human Rights
Committee is illustrative of this point. 79 In this case a group of Canadian citizens
petitioned the Committee to reverse the Canadian Government’s ban of their use of the
public telephone utility. This ban was imposed after the group had used the telephone
service to disseminate blatantly anti-semitic messages. The Committee refused to review
the case stating that the group members’ actions “clearly constitute[d] the advocacy of
racial or religious hatred,” which the Canadian government not only had a right to
restrict, but also an affirmative duty to prohibit under Article 20(2) of the ICCPR. 80
Once the Tribunal established the right and necessity of governments to prevent
incitement offences, it turned to the intent requirement of the offense. Here the ICTR
encountered the problem all courts face: How does one determine another’s intent?
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Entered into force, Mar. 23 1976. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 19(2) – (3).
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ii. The Content of the Speech
“The actual language used in the media has often been cited as an indicator of
intent.” 81 Thus, the Trial Chamber found it important to address the content of the
questionable speech.
In its opinion the Chamber reviewed a judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) reviewing the conviction of a Danish journalist for inciting hatred of
minority groups. The charge stemmed from the journalist’s interview and his own
subsequent editing of that interview for a report which aired during a television news
program. 82 During the program the journalist interviewed members of a racist youth
group. The members made many racist remarks against blacks and foreigners which were
aired on the program.
The Court found that the journalist’s conviction was a violation of his right to free
expression, and that the journalist did not incite or promote racial hatred. 83 The Trial
Chamber pointed to two facts critical to the ECHR’s findings. First, during the interview
the journalist posed a few questions suggesting there were very accomplished black
people in the world, contrary to the youth group members’ statements. Secondly, when
aired, the program was presented as a demonstration of the background and thinking of
extreme racist groups.
The ECHR identified some of the same tensions in preventing racist speech as the
Rwanda Tribunal did. Notably the ECHR points out in its reasoning that “combating
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racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations” is of “vital importance” in
modern society. 84 The opinion goes on to state that, “the freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society” and that the press
plays an important role in this. 85 The ECHR opinion announced that the Court would
look to “whether the item in question, when considered as a whole, appeared from an
objective point of view to have had as its purpose the propagation of racist views and
ideas.” 86 This is exactly the principle the Rwanda Tribunal takes from Jersild, and later
applies in the Media Cases. 87
The Tribunal examined another case before the UN Human Rights Committee
where a French author appealed a criminal conviction for hate speech. 88 This speech
arose from an interview in a French magazine. During the interview the author discussed
his views which deny the use of gas chambers by the Nazis as methods of extermination.
During the interview, the author stated several times that the gas chambers were a “myth”
or “fabrication.” In examining the content of the article the Committee concluded that the
author’s words demonstrated an intent to inflame rather than inform, stating, “[s]ince the
statements made by the author, read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or
strengthen anti-semitic feelings, the restriction [on his speech] served the respect of the
Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-semitism.” 89 The
Committee pointed out that there is room for scholarly writing that in challenging
accepted history, offends people. However, the article in question clearly demonstrated
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its intent to incite racism or anti-semitism, and, accordingly, the Committee upheld the
conviction. 90

iii. Context
The ICTR also reviewed cases in which the context of the statement provided the
court with insight into the speaker’s intent. In one case, the ECHR examined the
statements of a former mayor of a town in south-east Turkey. The former mayor made
these statements in a nationally circulated newspaper. During his interview the ex-official
declared his support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), while also disavowing the
use of violence struggles for independence. The former mayor was asked about recent
massacres of women and children by the PKK. In response the mayor said, “Anyone can
make mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by mistake.” 91 The statement was
made at a time of daily attacks by the separatist group. The ECHR looked to the full
context in which the statement occurred stating: “The statement cannot, however, be
looked at in isolation. It had special significance in the circumstances of the case.” 92 The
ECHR looked to the combined factors of the speaker’s stature as a former mayor, the fact
the statement was made during a time of attacks, and that these statements were made in
a national daily newspaper. The Court ultimately held that the mayor’s comments
amounted to incitement, and that his conviction was a proper exercise of the state’s
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power due to this context. 93 From this case the ICTR drew the conclusion that speech
which “is likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation” constitutes incitement. 94
In another case before the ECHR, a Turkish leaflet distributor appealed his
conviction for attempting to publicly distribute leaflets. 95 The leaflets argued that recent
government efforts to “clean up” the defendant’s city and “improve traffic flow” were
actually designed to repress the city’s Kurdish and impoverished Turkish residents. The
ICTR’s opinion singled out the European Court’s language which noted that a leaflet, in
general, could “conceal objectives and intentions different from the ones it proclaims.” 96
The ECHR eventually concluded that the leaflet in question was not inciting the citizenry
to violence when read in the context of the writing as a whole and in light of the broader
social situation. 97 Additionally, the European Court noted that opposition viewpoints
should enjoy special protections due to their minority status, particularly voicing
government criticism. 98 The ICTR’s opinion also picked up this line of reasoning, stating
that it is important to protect political speech, “particularly the expression of opposition
views and criticism of the government.” 99
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In a further ECHR case from Turkey, the Tribunal reviewed a book author’s
conviction for disseminating separatist propaganda. 100 The book was a narrative of a
period of armed conflict between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish government. The
period detailed in the book, however, pre-dated a current conflict, and the ECHR found
the book was simply a narrative of the author’s personal experiences of the earlier
violence. The Court conceded that the book was obviously not intended as a neutral
description of history and was meant to criticize (at times using vehement language) the
governmental authorities. However, the opinion points out that where governmental
criticism is concerned states have little latitude to restrict “political speech or debate on
questions of public interest.” 101 The Court again noted that minority and opposition
viewpoints should occupy a specially protected place in society. Finally, the European
Court examined the medium chosen by the author, a printed literary work. It stated that a
book was less inflammatory than a mass media broadcast or printing of similar material.
The medium of a published book, the court held, substantially limited the effect of the
author’s words on the public order. 102
The ICTR’s opinion later draws on the above conclusion; that some media are
more dangerous than others because of their immediacy. The Tribunal’s opinion notes
that radio is “particularly dangerous and harmful,” if used to incite. 103
iv. Causation
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The Tribunal analyzed one final factor in examining intent to incite: Did the
speech directly cause violence? In probing this element, the Tribunal first turned to a case
from the Nuremberg trials. The case involved Julius Streicher, the publisher and editor of
a weekly newspaper. The paper, called Der Stürner, regularly published articles,
editorials, and a letter calling for the execution of Jews. The Nuremberg tribunal found
that Streicher received updates on deportations and killings of Jews in concentration
camps. The judgment did not directly link Streicher’s paper to any particular killing;
rather, it found that Streicher poisoned the minds of Germans into acceptance of the
National Socialist plan of extermination of the Jewish people. 104 From the Streicher case
the ICTR drew two principles. First, international law does not require a court to find that
the speech in question directly cause violence. 105 Secondly, the Tribunal concluded that
the relevant inquiry is what the likely impact of the speech might be. 106 Both of these
conclusions operated to convict the defendants in the Media Cases more easily, and mark
a departure from the position of U.S. courts.
In a more recent ECHR case, the owner of a weekly review appealed his
conviction for his review’s publication of letters from readers condemning government
actions and officials. 107 The letters alleged that the Turkish government’s military actions
against the Kurds were aimed at eradicating the Kurds as an ethnic group. The letters
ended by reaffirming the Kurdish will to defeat the government forces. One letter also
named individual members of the government and stirred up enmity for them personally.
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The ECHR found that these letters went beyond the pale of simple government
criticism by a minority group. Rather the letters “must be seen as capable of inciting to
further violence in the region…the message which is communicated to the reader is that
recourse to violence is [] necessary.” 108 Additionally, the second letter, “identified
persons by name, stirred up hatred for them and exposed them to the possible risk of
physical violence.” 109 For the ECHR, these two factors pushed the letters into the realm
of “hate speech and the glorification of violence;” thus they were properly proscribed by
the Turkish authorities. 110
The defendant argued that he was not responsible for the content of his
publication, since as owner he had no editorial authority. The opinion of the ECHR
roundly dismissed this reasoning, stating that instead of diminished responsibility the
owner has just as great a duty to control the content of the paper as an editor. The Court
also noted that the owner’s responsibility included a duty to “shape the editorial direction
of the review.” 111 This was a particularly important precedent for the Rwandan Tribunal,
as it provided the principle that owners and shareholders can incur criminal liability for
the content of the media they own, even if they do not exercise direct editorial control. 112

v. The ICTR’s Conclusions
The Tribunal drew several points of law from the European Court precedents
regarding analysis of intent to incitement. First, it held that publishers and editors have
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generally been held accountable for the contents of their publications or broadcasts. 113
This arises since publishers and editors provide the forum for the speech. 114
Secondly, the actual word choice of particular speech has long been used as an
indicator of intent. Relying on Jersild, the ICTR drew the conclusion that a presenter’s
remarks distancing herself from those of the interviewee can be crucial to determining
responsibility in this area. 115 Additionally, drawing on Arslan, the Tribunal concluded
that a work clearly identified as demonstrating one group’s point of view is acceptable, as
long as there is adequate notice to the audience of the nature of the work. 116
Next, the Tribunal considered that in assessing editorial liability the context of the
message is of great importance. 117 This context includes events contemporaneous with
the transmission of the message as well as any secondary meaning a message may
carry. 118 Additionally, whether a message rises to the level of incitement is affected by its
medium of transmission. A message transmitted in the mass media has a much more
immediate, and potentially inflammatory, impact that a similar statement published in a
book. 119
The Tribunal also concluded that international jurisprudence imposes no strict
causation requirement. 120 Rather, the test is what the likely impact of the speech might be
given its content and context.121 An important consideration here is whether the speaker
is advocating a minority or opposition viewpoint; in those circumstances the speech
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should be given greater protections. 122 The Tribunal also noted that the converse is also
true, majority speech, especially government, or government-aligned speech deserves
special scrutiny when aimed at minority or opposition groups. 123
Finally, the Tribunal briefly reviewed U.S. incitement law, as one of the
defendants argued it set a higher standard. After first emphasizing that International Law
and not the domestic law of any one state was controlling, the Tribunal noted the accord
of American jurisprudence with the principles of international incitement law. The
Tribunal looked especially to Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) to support the
conclusion that speech made with an intent to incite can be banned. 124 I will discuss
Black further in Part IV.

B. Application of the International Incitement Framework to the Three Rwandan
Defendants
1. The Case against Ngeze
Hassan Ngeze was editor-in-chief of a newspaper called Kangura (meaning “to
wake others up”). 125 From February 1991 until publication ceased in 1995, the newspaper
was subtitled “The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People.” 126 During this
time period Kangura was the best known, and most widely circulated Rwandan paper. 127
One witness testified at trial that at least one issue specifically referred to Hutus as the
“majority people.” 128 He also stated that Ngeze called the paper “a voice of the Hutu.” 129
122
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Given that Hutus comprised around 80% of the population, the idea of “majority people”
was a clear one.
From early on Kangura published articles aimed at defaming Tutsis. One article,
called “The Ten Commandments,” suggested guidelines for keeping the Tutsi in check. It
described Tutsi women as spies who would use their sex to gain access to Hutu
households and businesses to obtain information and power for their ethnicity. The article
continued to state that any Hutu man who married a Tutsi woman, kept one as a
“concubine,” or made a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée was a traitor to the Hutu
race. 130 These “Ten Commandments” were a response to an article Ngeze published
earlier, entitled “The 19 Commandments.” This first piece was a list of supposed Tutsi
commands to subjugate, once again, the Hutu. 131 The cover of a November 1991 issue
featured a headline which read “What Weapons Shall We Use to Conquer the Inyenzi
Once and for All?” The cover also featured a picture of two soldiers, a machete, and a
reference to the 1959 revolution during which Hutus killed Tutsis with machetes, ousting
the Tutsi from power. Inyenzi is a word witch literally means “cockroach,” but which was
commonly used to refer to the rebel Tutsi groups from the 1960s on.132
Not long after, Kangura carried an editorial openly referring to all Tutsis as
Inyenzi, and suggesting that Tutsis never change; that the present-day Tutsi are no
different than the ruling Tutsi of the past. Consequently, the article leads the reader to
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conclude that Tutsis must be stopped, in much the same way as they were stopped after
the 1959 revolution. 133
Beginning in December 1990, Kangura published lists of people it dubbed
traitors, and asked its readers to send any incriminating information they had on these
people to the paper for publication. In February 1993, Ngeze published a list of 123
names of children along with their parents, who were suspected of supporting pro-Tutsi
groups. 134 This list was later determined to be an official government list of dissenters,
which Ngeze had obtained from bureaucrats in the Hutu administration. 135
The paragraph introducing the list told readers that these people were traitors,
insinuated that the government forces were unable to act against the listed people, and
that the readers should organize themselves against those listed. 136
The Trial Chamber found these lists particularly damning evidence, stating:
The names published…were generally done so in the context of a threat
that varied in explicitness. An official list of 123 names of suspects was
published in Kangura No. 40 with an express warning to readers that the
government was not effectively protecting them from these people and
that they needed to organize their own self-defense to prevent their own
extermination. This message classically illustrates the incitement of
Kangura readers to violence: by instilling fear in them, giving them names
to associate with this fear, and mobilizing them to take independent,
proactive measures in an effort to protect themselves. In some instances,
names were mentioned by Kangura without such an explicit call to action.
The message was nevertheless direct. That it was clearly understood is
overwhelmingly evidenced by the testimony of witnesses that being
named in Kangura would bring dire consequences. François-Xavier
Nsanzuwera called Kangura “the bell of death. 137
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The Chamber found that the general tone of the paper, throughout its existence,
was aimed at defaming and denigrating Tutsis. Additionally, the chamber found that
while much of the content focused simply on racial division or hatred, some of the
articles went beyond that. Notably, the publication of lists of names, as well as the cover
of the November 1990 issue, instilled the idea of killing Tutsi in the minds of the readers
of Kangura. 138
In addition to his activities at the newspaper, Ngeze drove a vehicle with a
megaphone on top. Through this megaphone he mobilized the Hutu population, calling
for them to come to meetings of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR). 139
As explored in Part II, the CDR was a pro-Hutu party, set up in direct opposition
to the RPF. The CDR traced its ideological heritage to the 1959 revolution, clearly
marking it as advocating Hutu supremacy and ethnic separation. The Trial Chamber
stressed that, at its outset, the party’s message was one of non-violence. As time
progressed, however, the message of the CDR became increasingly divisive, eventually
promoting violence against Tutsis. The CDR also developed a militia wing, which carried
out attacks against the RPF, as well as civilian Tutsis, and moderate Hutus. 140 Ngeze also
used the megaphone to spread the message that all Tutsi should be exterminated. While
Ngeze used the word “Inyenzi,” the Chamber noted that at the time of Ngeze’s actions the
words Inyenzi and Tutsi were synonymous. 141
In his defense Ngeze stated that Kangura was even-handed in its treatment of the
issues of the day, and particularly ethnic tensions. Ngeze specifically referred to
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Kangura’s printing of the “19 Commandments” as a concession to Tutsi viewpoints. The
Trial Chamber, however, expressly rejected this approach. It stated that even if the
content of the article was true, and did in fact represent a true Tutsi viewpoint (and was
not an article invented by Kangura to incite the Hutu population as the prosecution
argued) that the Tribunal must also examine the context of the article. 142
The Tribunal looked to the publication of the “Ten Commandments,” the proHutu article published shortly after the supposedly Tutsi-authored “19 Commandments.”
The “Ten Commandments” the Chamber noted, were presented as a rebuttal to the first
article. The Tribunal saw these two factors as evidence that both items should be read
together. When examining the first article in light of the second the intent of Kangura to
instill a culture of fear of the Tutsi became clear, the Chamber found. Additionally, the
Tribunal held that the testimony of witnesses demonstrated Kangura’s “well defined
perspective for which [it] was known.” 143 That is, Kangura openly advocated hatred of,
and violence against Tutsis.
The Tribunal also found that not only did Kangura report on the ethnic tension
and hatred of the period, but the paper failed to distance itself from the viewpoints it
expressed. Rather than positioning itself as a detached observer, as in the Jersild case
above, the paper became a loud voice in advocating ethnic hatred of Tutsi, as well as
calling for their extermination. The fact that Kangura was the most widely distributed
and well-known paper in Rwanda at the time of the genocide demonstrated the effect that
the paper could have on a very large segment of the Rwandan population. Thus, the
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Chamber found, the ability of Kangura to incite the populace to violence was that much
greater. 144
In examining the causal link between Kangura’s articles and ensuing violence the
Trial Chamber noted that incitement to genocide is an inchoate offence, continuing in
time from the formation of intent until the completion of the acts contemplated. Here the
overt act necessary is not actual genocide, but rather the dissemination of information
which has as its goal that its listeners form the intent to commit genocide. The Tribunal
held that incitement to genocide “is a crime regardless of whether it has the effect it
intends to have.” 145 The fact that actual genocide did follow, and could be directly linked
to some articles, was simply highly persuasive evidence of this overt act.
For the publications in Kangura, as well as his recruiting activities on behalf of
the CDR, the trial chamber convicted Hassan Ngeze of direct and public incitement to
genocide. 146 The Tribunal found that the content of Ngeze’s articles together with the
context, both in regard to other articles and with respect to the role Kangura played in
society, demonstrated intent to incite the Hutu population to commit genocide. The crime
was complete, the Chamber found, upon publication. That publishing these articles was
meant to incite genocide was demonstrated by the direct causal link between certain
articles (particularly the lists of names) and killings of Tutsis. 147

2. The Case Against Barayagwiza
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While not originally named an officer in the CDR, the Tribunal found
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was the behind-the-scenes leader of the party from its inception.
By the summer of 1992 the CDR was warning in its communiqués that “the Tutsi
minority wants to grab power through force and violence.” 148 Later releases also
contained lengthy lists of “enemies of Rwanda,” defined as anyone aiding the RPF, and
included nearly every leader of every opposition party. 149 Finally, the CDR alleged the
RPF had spies throughout Rwanda, conspiring to overthrow the current government to
benefit the Tutsi minority.
As the rhetoric of the party’s communiqués became increasingly violent, so did
the discourse at its rallies. The Trial Chamber found the word “tubatsembatsembe” or
“let’s exterminate them” was used in clear reference to the Tutsi at these rallies. In some
cases Barayagwiza himself led the chant; at other times militia and CRD officials chanted
tubatsembatsembe in Barayagwiza’s presence. This word also found its way into songs
sung by the CDR’s youth-militia. The ICTR held that Barayagwiza had the final say in
which words were used in the CDR speeches and songs. 150
The trial chamber found that Barayagwiza controlled the CDR and its political
message. The Tribunal also found that he had command over the CDR’s regular and
youth militias. From April 6th to July 17th, 1994 these militias, along with the
Interhamwe set up road blocks to identify and kill Tutsis. The Chamber further held that
Barayagwiza oversaw these roadblocks and in some instances gave direct orders for
killings. Additionally, he supplied the militia with weapons. 151
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The Tribunal had little difficulty finding Barayagwiza guilty of incitement to
genocide. He had direct responsibility for CDR communications and speeches supporting
killing Tutsis. Thus, like Ngeze, and the defendants in the Sürek and Streicher cases
above, Barayagwiza was held responsible as an editor for his control over the message.
He was also found guilty for his direct statements at rallies advocating the elimination of
Tutsis, as well as for his direct orders to kill Tutsis at the roadblocks. 152

3. The Case Against Nahimana
The third defendant, Ferdinand Nahimana, was the founder of the radio station
RTLM, and chaired the station’s “technical and programming committee.” As such he
controlled all content that the station aired. 153 He was also described by some witnesses
as the “top man” at RTLM, though there was some debate on this point. 154
RTLM was the most widely listened-to station in Rwanda in the early 1990s. It
was also widely regarded as “setting people at odds” with one another, and as heavily
favoring the Hutu. RTLM was very aware of both its large listener base and its
reputation; yet only twice were opposition viewpoints aired. During both of these
instances the Tutsis presenting their own views were ridiculed. 155
Leading up to April 6th, 1994, the broadcasts of RTLM became increasingly
insulting of Tutsis, and helped push a deep divide between the Hutu and Tutsi. 156 This
was accomplished through reference to the Tutsi as both a political group seeking to
undermine the Hutu government, and through stereotyping calculated to belittle the
152
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Tutsi. 157 All of this divisive broadcasting resulted in the people believing that RTLM was
“heating up heads,” and instilling fear in both sides. The Hutu feared a Tutsi attack, and
Tutsis began to fear violence by Hutus in anticipation of this alleged attack. 158
In a broadcast on March 14th, 1994 an RTLM talk-show host named a “traitor”
and this “traitor’s” family. The presenter claimed he had intercepted a letter from a RPF
commander to a subordinate. The radio host then proceeded to read much of this letter
over the airwaves. The body of the letter identified the area of operation of this RPF
group, as well as members of the commander’s family, including children. An
investigation by the ICTR Prosecutor after the genocide revealed that each person named
on the air that day, including the children, was killed during the genocide.159
The namings expanded during the first week of April, 1994. RTLM DJ’s
mentioned the names of several people suspected of either being RPF or helping them.
No evidence was ever presented on air that those named were actually aiding enemies of
Rwanda. DJ’s also speculated that two doctors with some Tutsi heritage were responsible
for the death of a Ministry of Health driver; this driver was also a CDR party official.
Again, without evidence, the radio host accused the two doctors of murdering a Hutu.
The trial chamber found strongly suggestive language in this latter broadcast, which
seemed to urge the neighbors of the accused to seek retribution for the killing on their
own. 160
Also during the first week of April, RTLM predicted an imminent attack on
Kigali in the next few days. Testimony showed that this validated, in the minds of much
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of the Hutu population, many of the rumors swirling around the streets during this
period. 161
After President Habyarimana’s plane crashed on April 6th, 1994, the radio
broadcasts from RTLM took a decided turn toward outright advocacy of genocide. The
trial chamber found many horrific examples. This one (marked at trial as exhibit
P103/40D) is representative:
So, where did all the Inkotanyi who used to telephone me go, eh? They must
have been exterminated. … Let us sing: “Come, let us rejoice: the Inkotanyi have
been exterminated! Come dear friends, let us rejoice, the Good Lord is just.” The
Good Lord is really just, these evildoers, these terrorists, these people with
suicidal tendencies will end up being exterminated. When I remember the
number of corpses that I saw lying around in Nyamirambo yesterday alone; they
had come to defend their Major who had just been killed. Some Inkotanyi also
went to lock themselves up in the house of Mathias. They stayed there and could
not find a way to get out, and now they are dying of hunger and some have been
burnt. However, the Inkotanyi are so wicked that even after one of them has been
burnt and looks like a charred body, he will still try to take position behind his
gun and shoot in all directions and afterwards he will treat himself, I don’t know
with what medicine. Many of them had been burnt, but they still managed to pull
on the trigger with their feet and shoot. I do not know how they are created. I do
not know. When you look at them, you wonder what kind of people they are. In
any case, let us simply stand firm and exterminate them, so that our children and
grandchildren do not hear that word “Inkotanyi” ever again. 162

The word Inkotanyi refers to the RPF, which RTLM broadcasts leading up to the
genocide clearly equate with all Tutsis.
One witness, and frequent RTLM listener, described RTLM programming after
April 6th saying;
RTLM was constantly asking people to kill other people, to look for those
who were in hiding, and to describe the hiding places of those who were
described as being accomplices… it was obvious that the people who were
speaking were happy to say that there had been massive killings of
Inyenzi, and they made no difference between Inyenzis and Tutsis. And
they said that they should continue to search for those people and kill them
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so that the future generations would have to actually ask what Inyenzis
looked like, or, ultimately, what Tutsis looked like. 163

In its reasoning the Trial Chamber stated that some of the broadcasts leading up to
April 6th were legitimate uses of radio. There were several discussions of political issues,
as well as presentation of news items in these broadcasts. The decision also pointed out
that ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis was nothing new in Rwanda, and the long
bloody history of the country certainly bore this out. During this period, however, there
were also many broadcasts aimed at denigrating Tutsis as a whole. It was at this stage, the
Chamber found, that RTLM presenters fully equated the terms Inyenzi and Inkotanyi with
all Tutsi, not just RPF forces or sympathizers. 164
The Tribunal also found evidence that violence followed RTLM broadcasts.
Several witnesses testified that RTLM presenters would identify individuals, a group of
people, or a certain area where RPF sympathizers were located, and within a few days
(and sometimes only a few hours) the individuals, members of the group, or people in the
area specified, would be dead. Indeed, after April 6th, 1994 RTLM was widely known as
“Radio Machete.” 165
In Sürek above, the ECHR noted that namings which have the mere possibility of
causing violence were proscribable. The Trial Chamber, however, not only found that
violence could likely result from the RTLM broadcasts, but also did in fact result from
some of these namings. 166 Thus, the crime of incitement was all the more apparent in the
instant case.
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The Trial Chamber held that Ferdinand Nahimana had direct oversight over
programming content at RTLM. Again drawing on Sürek and Streicher, the Tribunal
applied the international standard that editors are responsible for the content of their
broadcasts and publications. Next, in examining the content of the broadcasts, the
Chamber found that RTLM programming openly denigrated the Tutsi population,
instilling fear and hatred of them in the Hutus. RTLM also openly advocated
extermination of Tutsis as a group, as well as naming individual RPF members and
sympathizers to be killed. During a broadcast advocating the killing of Tutsi, one
particular announcer told his listeners to identify Inkotanyi by physical characteristics; he
stated, “just look at his small nose and break it.” 167 The Tribunal held up this statement as
a vivid symbol of the intent to destroy Tutsis as a group. 168
The Tribunal’s opinion also points to the immediate effect of radio on its listeners.
The opinion stated that instant transmission of radio messages, the ability of radio to
broadcast across large distances, and the appeal of the human voice in the transmission
make radio a particularly dangerous medium. The Trial Chamber found that the content
of hate of the RTLM broadcasts was “augmented by the visceral scorn coming out of the
airwaves.” 169 This combination of content and delivery served to enhance the message of
hate RTLM preached. 170
As for the above two defendants, the chamber noted that there is no need to prove
that genocide resulted from any particular broadcast. Rather, the crime of incitement to
genocide occurs when the broadcaster advocates killing a group with the intent that his

167

Id, ¶ 1032.
Id.
169
Id, ¶ 1031.
170
Id.
168

36

listeners carry out that killing. Here, the chamber had already found that killing of Tutsis
as a group did, in fact, follow many RTLM broadcasts. This fact demonstrated the intent
of the presenters at RTLM, the Tribunal found. 171
Given his oversight of radio programming, the clear genocidal message of RTLM,
and the clear intent of RTLM broadcasts, the Chamber found Ferdinand Nahimana guilty
of direct and public incitement to genocide. 172
The ICTR used international precedents and primary sources of international law
to convict the three defendants in the Media Cases. The defendants argued at trial,
however, that U.S. law set a higher standard. 173 In its opinion, the Tribunal dismissed the
argument. However, to more fully answer the question an examination of current
incitement jurisprudence in the United States is warranted.

IV. Current Incitement Law in the Untied States
Congress, after ratifying the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, passed enacting legislation, making genocide and incitement to
genocide a criminal offence. The statute reads, in part:
(a) Basic offense.--Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war,
in a circumstance described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent
to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group as such-(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members
of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the
physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
171
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(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group;
or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
…
(c) Incitement offense.--Whoever in a circumstance described in
subsection (d) directly and publicly incites another to violate subsection
(a) shall be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. 174
Subsection (d) states that the offence must be committed in the United States, or by a
U.S. national.
American courts have identified the same tension that the ICTR identified in the
media cases; the need to protect freedom of expression, while not allowing this freedom
to trample the rights of others. For example, the Supreme Court has held, “If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable” Texas v. Johnson 175 . At the same time, the Court has recognized categories
of speech that government can ban. 176
The Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 177 , engaged in a discussion of
incitement laws in the United States. The statute at issue in Brandenburg barred speech
that advocates violence as a means of political reform, as well as assembling to promote
this end. Rather than incitement to genocide, this could be characterized as incitement to
rebellion. This particular statute, however, covered a bit more than just rebellion, or
violence against the government.
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The defendant in this case was convicted under Ohio’s criminal syndicalism law
for a meeting of the Ku Klux Klan, which the defendant held at his farm. During that
meeting, the defendant, Brandenburg, while speaking to the group, stated that if the U.S.
government did not institute changes to meet the Klan’s objectives then, “there might
have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.” 178 He also proclaimed that African-Americans
should be returned to Africa and Jews should be deported to Israel.
The Court overturned Brandenburg’s conviction, reasoning that the government
cannot convict for speech that merely suggests violence. Rather, the state can only
proscribe speech which “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.” 179 The Court also drew distinctions between
speech which tells its listeners of violence in the abstract, or as a mere moral necessity;
and speech which “prepares a group for action and steel[s] it to such action.” 180 Here, the
court found that Ohio’s law failed to discriminate between these two levels of speech. On
the contrary, the law on its face forbids assembly to advocate a specific point of view.
Since there was no requirement in the statute that the action constitute an immediate and
credible threat, the Court overturned the conviction 181 .
In a concurrence Justice Douglas compared Brandenburg’s actions to Justice
Holmes’ famous “shouting fire in a crowded theater” incitement example. In the theater
scenario, Justice Douglas reasoned, speech is closely coupled with action. Conversely,
Brandenburg’s speech required nothing to be done immediately. It suggested future
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action, but at an indefinite time. 182 For Justice Douglas, the inciting speech must be so
linked to the ensuing prohibited behavior such that the “speech is brigaded with action…
apart from [this example], speech is, I think, immune from prosecution.” 183
The Supreme Court later clarified the issue of how closely linked the speech and
proposed action must be in Hess v. Indiana. 184 Here, in response to a police order to clear
the street during an anti-war protest, a student stated that the group would retake the
street later. The Court overturned the state-law conviction stating that at the worst the
speaker was suggesting illegal activity at an abstract moment in the future. The
conviction was overturned using the immediacy requirement from Brandenburg.
In another application of Brandenburg jurisprudence the Court examined a civil
rights boycott. 185 The boycott organizer, Charles Evers, stated that those who violated the
boycott would be “disciplined” and that “necks would be broken.” Here the Court
examined the context of the speech. It concluded that since the words were spoken during
a lengthy speech, and since the situation in which the words were uttered was the charged
atmosphere of the boycott rally, despite the fact that the words amounted to advocacy of
violence, they were not directed at a specific person at a defined time. This, Justice
Stevens explained, did not meet the immediacy requirement set out in Brandenburg. 186
More recently, in Virginia v. Black the Court turned its attention to a state statute
which banned only one activity: cross burning. Previously, in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul 187 , the Court had struck down a city ordinance on the basis that it forbade speech
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based upon the content of the speech. The ordinance in question in R.A.V. banned speech
that would “arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.” 188 The Court held that this ordinance picked out only certain types of
speech, while other types, which could be equally offensive, were not included. In Black
the majority points out that political affiliation, union membership and sexual identity are
among groups not included in the R.A.V. ordinance. 189
In Black, the Court, citing to R.A.V., expressly stated that some specific speech
can be banned if the prohibition is “based on the very reasons why…the speech at
issue…is proscribable.” 190 That is, if the underlying speech is rooted in sentiments which
are themselves able to be banned as actions, then the speech itself may also be forbidden.
In the Black case three defendants, all members of the Ku Klux Klan, burned or
attempted to burn crosses in violation of Virginia state law banning the practice. In
upholding the ban in general (though striking down a portion of the intent section of the
statute) the Court looked to the “long, pernicious” history of the Klan and cross burning.
Justice O’Connor admitted that not every cross burning was necessarily meant to
intimidate. In fact, defendant Black burned a cross on private property during a Klan
meeting. However, she reasoned that cross burnings aimed at non-members of the Klan
served only to intimidate. The historic record, said Justice O’Connor, demonstrates a long
legacy of cross-burning intimidation. The Klan’s own history, the opinion continued, was
replete with violence, which served to make the intimidation all the more credible.
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Moreover, the threat of violence this intimidation carried with it was explicit and very
real. 191
The opinion then discussed the link between incitement and “true threats.” Here,
Justice O’Connor defined a true threat as one “where the speaker means to communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence…[t]he speaker
need not actually intend to carry out the threat.” 192 The Court gave the example of
outlawing threats against the president, since they have “special force” given the
president’s status as leader of the country. For two of the Black defendants the exact
impetus to burn the cross was unclear; the intimidation could have been motivated by
race, sexual orientation, religion, or membership in a particular organization. It is the
intent to intimidate, and not the motivation behind the intimidation which makes cross
burning reprehensible, the court found. 193
The Court struck down part of the statute which stated that burning a cross is
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. The opinion held that defendants convicted
under the statute must have a separate intent to intimidate their victims. 194 The fatal flaw
of this element of the statute was that it failed to discriminate (much like the Ohio statute
at issue in Brandenburg) between cross burning done with intent to instill fear, and
burning done with intent to arouse anger, or even directed at other Klan members to
produce a sense of belonging. The statute’s prima facie intent portion also failed to
account for the placement of the cross; whether on a homeowner’s lawn, as part of a
public rally, or during a private gathering. Since the prima facie intent element of the
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statute lacked ability to discriminate in these circumstances the Court held that this
portion of the law was unconstitutional. Here, the intent portion was offensive to the First
Amendment, since speech not intended to intimidate is not proscribable. 195

V. A Brief Comparison of the International and U.S. Approaches to Incitement

The reasoning of the Tribunal in the Media Cases and American incitement
jurisprudence are very similar, though the Tribunal’s opinion differs in two key facets.
First, the ICTR examined European and other international jurisprudence which has not
protected speech to the same extent at the U.S. First Amendment. Secondly, the Tribunal
did not apply the same temporal restraints that U.S. courts do. Notwithstanding these
differences, the ultimate verdicts in the Media Cases would not have been different if
decided under U.S. law.
One factor the trial chamber examined in the Media Cases was the ongoing pitting
of the Hutu against the Tutsi. This was accomplished over a period of years by all three
defendants. It was partly due to this instigation of racial tension that the Chamber
returned convictions. This reasoning, however, is not supported by Brandenburg and
Black. Rather, this denigration of Tutsis by the Hutu media and political parties might be
characterized as speech aimed at arousing anger, but not at inciting immediate violence
by the listeners.
For instance, the Kangura articles equating all Tutsi with Inyenzi, simply do not
rise to this higher standard. While this speech is certainly insulting it lacks a credible call
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to immediate violence. Under Black 196 one could argue that throughout Rwanda’s history
equating a larger group with Inyenzi was a threat to the safety of those people. However,
there was no evidence presented that this equation resulted in immediate violence toward
that group. This is not the same as “speech brigaded with action” described in
Brandenburg. 197
On the other hand, some acts of the Media Cases defendants, certainly met the
U.S. standard. This is especially true of the lists of names published in the paper, and
announced over RTLM. Given Rwanda’s violent history, the large following of the paper
and radio, and the climate following April 6th, 1994, it was virtually certain that readers
of Kangura and those listening to RTLM would take action against anyone identified as a
RPF member or sympathizer. Indeed, the trial chamber heard testimony that the militias
manning the roadblocks would stay tuned into RTLM so they would know whom to kill
next, and where to find their victims. The same was true of the political rallies hosted by
the CDR. Few threats could be more true or imminent than Barayagiwza ordering
enraged masses (which he had taken the trouble to arm) to exterminate Tutsis.
The Trial Chamber made clear that to be convicted of incitement each of the
victims needed to have the intent that their audiences commit genocide. The Supreme
Court conducted a similar analysis in Black 198 (in fact, the Chamber cited to Black in
support of its ruling 199 ). This is an important element of protection of those charged with
intent crimes. Without the intent that their listeners immediately engage in violence, some
speakers will be deprived of important speech rights.
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The situation in Rwanda bore witness to this point. The defendants all stated that
rather than trying to instigate genocide, they were engaging in lively political debate.
They argue that the politics of Rwanda are so deeply rooted along ethnic lines, that ethnic
tensions, and the exploitation of those tensions, are just a part of political life. 200
The Chamber wholly agreed with this point regarding some instances. One such
situation was an interview that Barayagwiza gave on RTLM. He described growing up
Hutu in a decidedly Tutsi-centric country. He spoke of his parents and grandparents
toiling away in the houses and farms of rich Tutsi while they lived in poverty. He
described what he felt when the only answer to the question “why are things this way,”
was “because they are.” In this interview Barayagwiza also made disparaging remarks
about the Tutsi as a whole. Regardless, the Chamber characterized this interview (and
several others also recounting what it is to be Hutu, and what community perceptions of
the Tutsi were) as permissible speech. 201
The result would be the same under U.S. jurisprudence. Black burned a cross at a
Klan meeting not to incite members to violence, but to create feelings of belonging in the
other members. The Media Cases defendants (in speech like the interview described in
the paragraph above) did not intend to instigate wiping out the Tutsi in part or in whole.
Instead, they wished to communicate their displeasure with the current economic
situation (a common Hutu complaint was that the Tutsis had all the wealth), or to express
their feelings on the subject of what it is to be Hutu. While none of the above actions can
be characterized as entirely noble (they all do contain some element of deriding another
group), they certainly fall within the ambit of protected speech.
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Of course, the listing of names both in Kangura and on RTLM, Ngeze’s use of a
megaphone to urge others to violence, and Barayagwiza’s public calls for extermination
are all clear examples of speech which meets the U.S. standard. In many instances the
ICTR found that violence directly followed these acts. The tribunal even found that
Barayagwiza lead extermination groups.
Thus, an application of U.S. jurisprudence to the Media Cases would provide the
same result; conviction of all three defendants. Some of the defendants’ speech, however,
would have received much greater protection in U.S. courts. While genocide is an evil
which is to be abhorred by all, and prevented by serious laws, these preventions cannot
infringe too far upon the expression of others. The immediacy requirement helps to
ensure that words uttered too far in the past will not be cause for future criminal
responsibility for incitement offences.

VI. Conclusion
With its chaotic history of ethnic strife, and leaders willing to twist this history to
their own political ends, perhaps the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was inevitable. Even so,
the question remains: Would the killings have been as widespread and numerous without
the complicity of the media and political parties?
Some would argue that the naming of suspected RPF members and sympathizers
in particular warrants stricter statutes and more active enforcement of incitement laws.
However, in a free society, any law that restricts actions of media or political
organizations must be carefully scrutinized. What makes this task more difficult is that it
is often groups and individuals who espouse viewpoints on the fringes of socially
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acceptable discourse which test our collective patience, as well as our incitement laws.
These groups (and the KKK and anti-semetic groups discussed in this article are prime
examples) often garner little sympathy for their speech from the public. However, these
same groups also serve as the miners’ canary of expressive and speech freedoms. Their
demise is the first indication of a catastrophe near at hand.
Thus, it is important to preserve a distanced and detached attitude when
evaluating speech by groups which are repulsive to a society, and reflect on the larger
implications. Curtailing the speech of groups on the edge of social discourse can soon be
turned toward other underrepresented groups. As the Supreme Court noted in Black,
“[we] need to walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing the bigot’s hateful idea
with all [our] power, yet at the same time challenging any community’s attempt to
suppress hateful ideas by force of law.” 202
We as a society must closely examine any limitation of our expressive freedoms,
while balancing this against the need to be free from violence. Certainly, preserving the
public peace is instrumental to the free exchange of ideas. Therefore, it is only when the
questioned speech presents an immediate threat of violence that it can be considered
incitement to violence.
Perhaps, the idea of “true threats” discussed in Black 203 requires some further
development to become a truly workable standard. The idea, however, that only “true
threats” to immediate violence are proscribable is what sets apart U.S. jurisprudence from
the precedents discussed in the Media Cases. This standard provides a greater protection
of the freedom of expression, while still preventing speech such as the namings and the
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other more heinous behavior of the three defendants in the Media Cases. As such, this
temporal constraint should be required whenever courts of law consider the crime of
incitement to violence.
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